

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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CARLOS PETERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

8:13-CV-0568  
(MAD/TWD)

GARY L. SHARPE, et al.,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES:

CARLOS PETERSON, 08-B-3052  
Plaintiff *pro se*  
Clinton Correctional Facility  
P.O. Box 2002  
Dannemora, NY 12929

OF COUNSEL:

THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge

**ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION**

The Clerk has sent this *pro se* complaint together with an application to proceed *in forma pauperis* to the Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1 and 2.) For the reasons discussed below, I grant Plaintiff's *in forma pauperis* application (Dkt. No. 2) and recommend that the action be dismissed without leave to amend.

**I. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS***

Plaintiff has applied to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (Dkt. No. 2.) A court may grant *in forma pauperis* status if a party "is unable to pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's *in forma pauperis* application (Dkt. No. 2), I find that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed *in forma*

*pauperis* is granted.<sup>1</sup>

## II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF COMPLAINT

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that when “any person” proceeds *in forma pauperis*, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, *inter alia*, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff “show” that he or she is entitled to relief means that a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is *plausible* on its face.’” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (emphasis added). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not shown -- that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).

“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” *Hernandez v. Coughlin*, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Courts are “obligated to construe a

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<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff should note that although the application to proceed *in forma pauperis* has been granted, Plaintiff will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.

*pro se* complaint liberally.” *Harris v. Mills*, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678.

When screening a complaint, the court has the duty to show liberality towards *pro se* litigants. *Nance v. Kelly*, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering *sua sponte* dismissal of a *pro se* complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties have had an opportunity to respond.” *Anderson v. Coughlin*, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).

### **III. ANALYSIS**

Each of the named Defendants in this action is a judge. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights by dismissing lawsuits that he filed. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Judges are entitled to absolute immunity for actions relating to the exercise of their judicial functions. *Mireless v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991). Judicial immunity has been created for the public interest in having judges who are ““at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.”” *Huminski v. Corsones*, 396 F.3d 53, 74 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Pierson v. Ray*, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). Judicial immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly. *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.12 (1976) (citing *Pierson*, 386 U.S. at 553-554). Judicial immunity is immunity from suit, not just immunity from the assessment of damages. *Mitchell v. Forsyth*, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Here, the complaint involves Defendants’ exercise of their judicial functions. Therefore, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed.

Where a *pro se* complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court *generally* “should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” *Cuoco v. Moritsugu*, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff’s] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” *Id.* (citation omitted). Here, better pleading would not cure the defect with Plaintiff’s complaint. Therefore, I recommend that the Court dismiss the complaint without leave to amend.

**WHEREFORE**, it is hereby

**ORDERED** that the application to proceed *in forma pauperis* (Dkt. No. 2) is **GRANTED**; and it is further

**RECOMMENDED** that the complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed without leave to amend; and it is further

**ORDERED** that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. **FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW.** *Roldan v. Racette*, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing

*Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs.*, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a).

Dated: May 24, 2013  
Syracuse, New York

  
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Thérèse Wiley Dancks  
United States Magistrate Judge